Of late in the Ukrainian crisis, Vladimir Putin has divested himself from his prior rhetoric of espousing the 'freedom' of the Russian-speaking people in the east and south of Ukraine. He has claimed to have ordered a withdrawal of Russian troops from the Ukrainian border (though it is uncertain as to whether or not they have pulled back), and even recently suggested that the referendums in the breakaway eastern regions be delayed. The referendums went ahead regardless with scant resources and no independent oversight or accountability; as expected, the vote was a landslide in favor of breaking away from Ukraine.
Many were surprised by Putin's apparent left-turn on Ukraine and the breakaway provinces. This would, however, play into the 'soft power' portion of the Kremlin's Ukrainian strategy: while incorporating an intractable propaganda machine that continually shouts that the Russian-speaking population in Ukraine is in danger from the 'Nazis' in Kiev, Putin allows for himself to look modest. By pulling back when tensions are at their highest and Ukraine looks to be on the brink of a civil war due to the insurgency of pro-Russian groups, he casts himself in the light of 'peace broker.' This puts him in position to look like a more decent, respectable figure with the Ukrainian governmental elections coming up. There is no saying whether or not the citizens in the non-breakaway portions of Ukraine will respond to this, but it might be more for the benefit of the provinces he is trying to influence.
It may also be, however, that the sanctions and economic malaise that has struck Russia since their obvious incursions into Crimea and Eastern Ukraine have finally started to take a toll on Putin and his inner circle. When accounting for political strategy and use of a military, one tends to think that money is no issue, that the government will be able to continually support its efforts. That would not be plausible, however, if Putin's threat to turn off the gas to Europe were carried out; the Russian ruble would, in global trading markets, be sold off due to fear of extreme recession, if not depression. Oil and gas exports to Europe are Russia's lifeblood, and even the threat of flipping the switch is enough to dent the car of state.
This would explain why Putin has begun seeking increased Chinese investment into the Russian economy. Without European and US investment (into everything but gas and oil, which remain untouched as of now), the Russian economy has been sliding on its own oil. Growth this year has been downgraded to a range between 0% and 0.5%, or even projected to shrink, whereas before the Ukrainian crisis, growth had been estimated to be at 2.5%. Billions of reserve dollars were converted into rubles to create some form of liquidity within the Russian economy, though it isn't slowing the progression of the economy from bad to worse.
Perhaps, when planning the Ukrainian intervention and ruminating on the glory of the Soviet era, Putin didn't realize just how much Russia needs the EU more than the EU needs Russia. The EU has already begun seeking new sources of fuel from other partners, such as the US, set to experience a massive growth in its natural gas creation and exports due to fracking, or even from unlikely partners such as Iran, whose new moderate government finds that they can use the EU's need as a way of bargaining their way out of their nuclear-issue sanctions.
Sun Tzu succinctly stated that, "No nation has ever benefited from protracted warfare." Russia has had its military presence in Chechnya since the end of the Cold War, and expanding its military for use in Ukraine only serves to damage the Russian economy even further.
If Putin's sudden reticence to criticize the government in Kiev and encourage referenda in breakaway provinces is due to Russia's economic malaise, then those in the EU and US can take a sigh of relief; if, and this is more likely due to Putin's turn to China, Putin's pullback is due to a calculated strategy of creating a buffer zone between Russia and NATO's expanding borders, then those in Ukraine will remain on edge. The pseudo-republics in East Ukraine will remain as a problem for both Kiev and the EU, and the other countries on Russia's border, while worried now, should be even more suspicious of Russian rhetoric in the future.
This article is copyrighted by Travelers Today, the travel news leader
